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INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and ethicists have long disagreed about the
permissibility of lying.' On one side of this divide are those such as Saint
Augustine and Immanuel Kant who articulate a clear and categorical
prohibition on lying., On the other side of the philosophical divide are
those who reject a categorical approach in favor of a more nuanced
view- that lies, at some times and tinder some circumstances, are
justifiable. 3 A similar debate is now taking place among lawyers and
judges who work in the criminal justice system about the appropriateness
of prosecutors· and defense lawyers assisting and supervising lies and
other forms of deceit in investigating criminal cases.
Is it ever ethical for a lawyer to ask or assist another to lie on behalf
of a client? During the past year, I have asked many lawyers and judges

r. For a discussion of the general topic of lying and other forms of deceit, see

SISSELA

BoK,

LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1979).
2. See id. at 34·
3· See id. at 30 ("While we know the risks of lying, and would prefer a world where others
abstained from it, we know also that there are times when it would be helpful, perhaps even necessary,
if we ourselves could deceive with impunity.").
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this question in a series of discussion forums around the United States on
proposed changes to the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Standards. When one asks lawyers and judges whether it is ethical for a
lawyer to ask or assist another to lie on behalf of a client, my experience
has been that the most likely initial answer is a categorical, almost
reflexive, "no," which seems to echo Augustine and Kant. Further
discussion and reflection, though, tends to reveal a range of more
nuanced views about investigative deceit, especially in criminal practice.
The recognition that prosecutors regularly supervise police and
informants who engage in deceit makes many lawyers uncomfortable
with a categorical prohibition.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as state
legal ethics codes across the United States modeled on these Model
Rules have long set forth categorical prohibitions of false statements and
other forms of deceit. 4 But a growing number of jurisdictions have
concluded that such categorical prohibitions should yield to the needs
and customs of criminal law enforcement and criminal defense practice,
and have authorized the use of investigative deceit. A wide range of both
moral and practical concerns appears to have driven this trend of
reexamining and modifying categorical bans on deceit.
Part I of this Essay sets out the existing provisions of the Model
Rules that are most relevant to the use of investigative deceit. Part II
describes how a number of jurisdictions have recently modified their
stances and taken a variety of approaches in permitting such deceit. Part
III canvasses various arguments for and against abandoning the
categorical view.
I. THE ISSUE
In exploring various rules and arguments about investigative deceit,
it will be helpful at various points in this Essay to have some concrete
factual scenarios to which to refer. Consider the following two scenarios.
Scenario A: Lawyer A's client is charged with possessing child
pornography on his work computer and forcing a twelve-year-old
Complainant to view the pornography. Client A and Complainant
A were acquainted through a mentoring program, and
Complainant A often spent time at Client A's place of work.
Complainant A knew Client A's computer password and offered to
show the investigating officer the location of the pornographic
images.
Lawyer A learns that Complainant A has a history of both false
sexual allegations and of accessing pornography on the Internet.

4· See, e.g., MoDEL CoDE oF PROF'L REsPoNsmruTY DR r-r02(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5) (1969);
STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 305-306, 498-505 (2010
ed. 2010) (discussing state adoptions and variations of Model Rule 4.1(A) and Model Rule 8-4(c)).
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Lawyer A strongly suspects Complainant A, rather than his client,
accessed and placed the pornography on Client A's computer.
Lawyer A wants to inspect Complainant A's home computer for
similar pornography, which would help exculpate Client A by
supporting the inference that Complainant A rather than Client A
was responsible for the pornography on Client A's computer.
Lawyer A is afraid, however, that if he openly asks Complainant A
to do so, then he will destroy any pornographic images on his
computer.
Lawyer A wants to hire a private investigator to gain access to
Complainant A's computer through deception. The private
investigator would pose as a computer consultant conducting a
survey of computer use by young people. He would contact
Complainant A and his family and offer to swap Complainant A's
computer for a new laptop computer that would purportedly allow
the consultant to monitor Complainant A's computer use. Once the
private investigator obtains Complainant A's computer, Lawyer A
plans to have an expert examine the computer for pornography.

***
Scenario B: Lawyer B's client is charged with sexual assault based
on allegations that he had sexual intercourse with a young woman
without her consent. Both Client B and Complainant B are
students at a large university who knew one another well prior to
the alleged rape. The charged crime is alleged to have taken place
in Client B's bedroom at a fraternity on the night of a party
following a football game. Client B admits the intercourse took
place but claims that Complainant B consented. Complainant B has
told police that she did not consent and that Client B had
intercourse with her when she was unconscious, having passed out
after admittedly drinking too heavily at the party.
Lawyer B interviews a mutual acquaintance of both Client Band
Complainant B, who tells her that Client B and Complainant B
were dating for the six months prior to the alleged rape and that
their relationship had become turbulent in the weeks just prior to
the incident. Client B was upset that Complainant B was
considering breaking off their relationship and accepting a job after
graduation in a distant city. The friend tells Lawyer B that
Complainant B tends to be a very moderate drinker. The friend
also says that Complainant B, as well as many of her friends who
were at the party in question, have been discussing both the alleged
rape and ComplainantB's relationship with Client B extensively on
Complainant B's Facebook page.
Lawyer B wants to hire a private investigator to gain access to
Complainant B's Facebook page through deception. The private
investigator, a forty-five-year-old former police officer, maintains
two Facebook pages under assumed names. On one of these pages,
he presents himself as a twenty-one-year-old male university
student and, on the other, as a nineteen-year-old female university
student. Both pages use photos that are not of the investigator, but
of attractive young people. The investigator, using one or both of
his undercover Facebook personas, would attempt to have
Complainant B "friend" him to allow him access to her page. He

\

\
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would examine the page for any useful exculpatory or impeachment
material. He would also attempt to engage Complainant B in
conversation, seeking to obtain exculpatory and impeachment
material.
Lawyers A and B come to you for advice. Are their investigative
plans ethically permissible under the Model Rules of Professional
·
Conduct?
Several Model Rules bear on the use of deceit in investigations and
interact to create potential ethical liability for both Lawyer A and
Lawyer B. Among them, Rules 5·3 and 8.4(a) deal with the responsibility
of lawyers regarding the acts of nonlawyers. 5 Rules 4.1 and 8-4( c), on the
other hand, directly address false statements and other forms of deceit. 6
Lawyers do, at times, choose to conduct their own undercover
factual investigations. 7 But for a number of reasons, they typically leave
such work to other people, usually nonlawyers. A lawyer may lack the
skills needed for effective investigation or simply fear the physical risks it
might entail in the criminal context. A lawyer might be concerned that,
because of her role as counsel, she is likely to be recognized by those
being investigated. The advocate-witness rule also discourages a lawyer
from personally engaging in such factual investigation. If the lawyer
becomes a key witness by participating in an investigation, the lawyer
may well be disqualified from participating in the case as counsel. 8
A.

RESPONSIDILITY FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS

Model Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) can create ethical liability for lawyers
related to the acts of nonlawyers. Both rules apply to conduct by a
nonlawyer that is inconsistent with the professional obligations of a
lawyer. 9
Rule 5-3, entitled "Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants,"
imposes both obligations and responsibilities on lawyers " [w]ith respect
to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer."'" A
lawyer hiring someone to conduct an investigation of the sort described
in Scenarios A and B above could trigger two separate sections of Rule
5-3· Subsection (b) requires a lawyer supervising a nonlawyer to "make
reasonable efforts to ensure" that the nonlawyer's "conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."" Under Rule
5.3(b), a lawyer who employs an investigator who engages in deceit
5· MoDEL RuLES oF PRoF'L CoNoucr R. 5.3, 8.4(a) (2010).
6. ld. R. 4.1, 8-4(c).
7· See, e.g., In re Gatti, 8 P.3d g66, 969 (Or. 2000).
8. See MoDEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNOucr R. 3.7(a) (2010) ("A lawyer shall not act as advocate at
a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness .... ").
9· See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCf R. 5.3, 8-4(a) (2010).
10. Id. R. 5·3 (emphasis added).
II. Jd. R. 5-3(b).
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might be sanctioned for the lawyer's own failure to make a reasonable
12
effort to prevent the investigator from using deceit. Ethical liability
under Rule 5-3(b ), while clearly related to the nonlawyer's use of deceit,
is not truly vicarious, since it is based on the lawyer's own omission.
Subsection (c) of Rule 5-3, in contrast to subsection (b), imposes
ethical liability for a lawyer's acts rather than omissions. It states that the
lawyer "shall be responsible" for conduct by a nonlawyer assistant if the
lawyer "orders" or "ratifies" the conduct. 13 Subsection (c) makes the
lawyer responsible for the investigator's conduct and, thus, imposes true
vicarious liability. 14
Rule 8-4(a) also creates potential ethical liability for a lawyer who
hires an investigator who uses deceit. Rule 8-4(a) states: "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another ... . "'5 As with Rule 5.3, Rule 8.4(a)
creates two different paths to liability. First, the lawyer might be
sanctioned for assisting or inducing the investigative deceit, with liability
roughly equivalent to criminal law accomplice liability. Second, the
lawyer might be sanctioned for violating ethical rules about deceit
"through the acts of another."
In sum, Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) together create four possible avenues
for ethics authorities to sanction Lawyers A and B in the fact patterns
above: (r) failing to stop the deceit, (2) ordering or ratifying the deceit,
(3) assisting or inducing the deceit, and (4) engaging in deceit "through
the acts of another." Defense attorneys, such as Lawyers A and B, who
use nonlawyers to conduct undercover investigations, open themselves to
each avenue of liability. An investigator hired by a defense lawyer easily
falls within Rule 5·3 's broad language of being "employed or retained by
or associated with" the defense lawyer. 16 Such a lawyer fails to take
measures to stop the deceit, fulfilling Rule 5.3(b ), and also orders and
ratifies the deceit, fulfilling Rule 5.3(c). Such a lawyer also knowingly
assists and induces the investigator, as required by Rule 8-4(a), by
providing information and payment. For the same reason, the lawyer can
easily be said to be violating prohibitions on deceit through the acts of
another.
The prosecutor's relationship with police or informants who engage
in deceit does not fall quite so easily within all of these provisions as does
the relationship between a private lawyer and a private investigator.
Nonetheless, the language in both Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) is broad enough
12. See id.
13. ld. R. 5.3(c) (emphasis added).
14. See id.
15. Id. R. 8-4(a) (emphasis added).
r6. I d. R. 5·3·
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to make prosecutors ethically liable for investigative deceit by police and
informants. Police officers who operate undercover, for example, are not
"employed or retained" by prosecutors. 17 They are employed by the
police department, not the district attorney's office. But police and
informants used by police and prosecutors can easily be said to be
"associated" with the prosecutor, thus triggering liability under Rule
J8
5·3·
B.

LYING AND DECEIT

In order to trigger lawyer liability under Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a), the
conduct of an investigator must be such that it would violate ethical rules
"if engaged in by a lawyer." 19 What do the Model Rules say, then, about
lies and other forms of deceit?
Two key Model Rules directly address lying and deceit. Rule 4.1
states, "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person .... "'a Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 employs a definitional sleight-ofhand to exempt some types of false statements typically made in the
context of negotiations, such as estimates of price or value, from Rule
4.1(a)'s prohibition.'! The comments to Rule 4.1 currently contain no
similar exemption for false statements made during criminal
investigations, whether by prosecution or by defense.
Undercover investigations routinely involve the making of material
false statements of fact. Investigators going "undercover" and informants
cooperating with the police make false statements of fact about their
identities and purposes. In order to establish credibility, investigators and
informants may also make false statements with respect to such things as
their prior criminal history and connections with criminals. In Scenario A
above, for example, the investigator would make false statements about
who he is, his work and employer, and the reason he wants to swap a new
laptop for Complainant A's computer. If asked, he would also make a
false statement about what will happen to the Complainant's computer
during the swap and where it will be kept. In Scenario B, the investigator
going on Facebook to investigate the rape allegations will make false
17. See id. ("With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer .... ").
18. See id.
19. ld. R. 5.3(c).
20. I d. R. 4.1 (a).
21. Id. cmt. 2 ("Tbis Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.
Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an
acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an·
undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of tbe principal would constitute fraud.").
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statements about his name, age, gender, occupation, physical description,
and any other information needed to create the Facebook page of his
undercover persona. He will also make additional false statements, if
necessary, to have Complainant B grant him access to her Facebook
page.
The other key rule addressing deceit is Rule 8.4(c), which provides
that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation .... " This
provision is broader than Rule 4.r(a)'s prohibition of false statements. It
bans false statements and a great deal more. For the reasons pointed out
above, 23 undercover investigations often involve "dishonesty," "deceit"
and, "misrepresentation."
The language of Rules 4.r(a) and 8-4(c) clearly bars the sorts of
statements and other conduct engaged in by private defense
investigators, police, and informants during undercover investigations if
they were "engaged in by a lawyer." Rules 5·3 and 8-4(a) make lawyers
ethically liable for such statements made by nonlawyers employed,
retained, or associated with them. 24 These rules on their face thus dictate
ethical liability for the lawyers in Scenarios A and B. The language of
these rules also dictates ethical liability for prosecutors associated with
police and informants who make similar false statements and engage in
similar undercover deceit.
What should we make of the fact that these categorical rules were
adopted at a time when it was widely recognized that prosecutors
regularly supervise police and informants who engage in undercover
deceit in pursuing investigations? Were these rules meant to curb
prosecutorial participation in and acceptance of such undercover
investigative techniques? Did the Model Rules' drafters intend to
exempt prosecutors despite not recording such an exemption within the
text or comments of the applicable ethical rules? Or did it just not occur
to them that prosecutorial involvement in undercover investigations was
implicated by these Rules? We will return to these questions below.
22

II.

CuRRENT APPROACHES

A number of jurisdictions have modified their ethics rules to allow
lawyers to utilize deceptive investigations. The substance of these
modifications varies from state to state. Some exempt only government
lawyers from the deceit rules when they are pursuing undercover
investigations, which I refer to below as an "asymmetrical" approach.
Others exempt both prosecutors and defense counsel, which I refer to as

22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 8-4(c) (2010).
23. See discussion supra Part LB.
24. See discussion supra Part LA.

L

.\
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a "symmetrical" approach. Some states allow lawyers personally to
engage in deceit, which I refer to as "personal" deceit. More commonly,
though, jurisdictions maintain a ban on personal deceit by lawyers, while
allowing lawyers to participate in investigations in which someone else,
such as a police officer or private investigator, does the deceiving. I refer
to this approach as permitting "vicarious" deception.
States that allow investigative deceit have accomplished this result
through a variety of means. Some have chosen to amend the text of their
ethical rules in a variety of ways, such as allowing investigative deceit
through amendment of a comment to their ethical rules. Still other
jurisdictions have created an investigative deceit exception through the
interpretation of existing rules by a court or an ethics committee.
A.

THE AsYMMETRICAL APPROACH

A few jurisdictions have created exemptions from their versions of
the Model Rules for prosecutors. In these jurisdictions, neither Lawyer A
nor Lawyer B, as defense lawyers, would be permitted to use the
investigative techniques proposed above.
Florida amended its analog to Model Rule 8-4(c) to include the
following: "[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer for a
criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise others
about or to supervise another in an undercover investigation .... " 25 The
comment to this language makes clear that it exempts government
lawyers from both the deceit provisions of Rule 8.3 as well as the false
statement provision of Rule 4.1:
Subdivision (c) recognizes instances where lawyers in criminal law
enforcement agencies or regulatory agencies advise others about or
supervise others in undercover investigations, and provides an
exception to allow the activity without the lawyer engaging in
professional misconduct. The exception acknowledges current,
acceptable practice of these agencies. Although the exception appears
26
in this rule, it is also applicable to rules 4-4.1 and 4-4.3.

This language in the Florida version of Rule 8-4( c) adopts an
asymmetrical approach that allows vicarious deception by government
lawyers. The Rule avoids explicitly stating that these investigations
involve false statements and deceit, choosing to imply such falsity and
deceit by use of the word "undercover." Florida's Rule 8.4 also has an
unusual and narrowly crafted exemption, which allows personal deceit by
a lawyer who is working for the government as an investigative agent
rather than as a lawyer. 27

25. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8-4(c) (2010).
26. ld. cmt.
27. I d. R. 4-8-4(c) ("[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity

other than as a lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an
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Alabama has taken a different path to creating an asymmetrical
vicarious deceit exemption for government lawyers. Rather than
modifying the rules that directly deal with false statement and deceit, its
versions of Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c), Alabama chose to modify its version of
Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor." The relevant
language of Alabama's Rule 3.8(2) states:
(a) Notwithstanding Rules 5-3 and 8.4, the prosecutor, through
orders, directions, advice and encouragement, may cause other
agencies and offices of government, and may cause non-lawyers
employed or retained by or associated with the prosecutor, to engage
in any action that is not prohibited by law . .. ; and
(b) To the extent an action of the government is not prohibited by
law but would violate these Rules if done by a lawyer, the prosecutor
(1) may have limited participation in the action, as provided in (2)(a)
above, but (2) shall not personally act in violation of these Rules. ' 8

The Alabama drafters were more circumspect than Florida's about
approving participation in undercover investigations. The phrase "any
action that is not prohibited by law" in 3.8(2)(a) could cover a whole host
of things. The phrase "shall not personally act in violation" in 3.8(2)(b)
appears to exempt only vicarious deception, and the language "may have
limited participation" sets an undefined limit on prosecutorial
involvement in vicarious deception.
The comment to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct is
much more forthcoming. It specifically states:
in undercover and sting operations, the making of false statements is
the essence of the activity. The prosecutor is prohibited by Rule 4.1(a)
from making false statements and is prohibited by Rule 8-4(a) from
knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate the
Rules .... [P]aragraph (2)(a) makes clear that the prosecutor may
order, direct, encourage and advise with respect to any lawful
governmental action. However, where lawyers generally are prohibited
by the Rules from taking an action, the prosecutor is likewise
prohibited from personally violating the Rules. In such situations, the
prosecutor's actions, as distinct from those of other governmental
entities, are limited so as to preserve the integrity of the profession of
law.'9

Thus, Alabama's investigative deceit exemption is both asymmetrical
and vicarious, like Florida's. But Alabama's is also narrower than
Florida's in that it exempts only prosecutors, not all government
lawyers.30

undercover investigation .... ").
28. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2009) (emphasis added).
29. ld. cmt. (emphasis added).
30. ld. ("Paragraph (2) is applicable only to lawyers acting as prosecutors. It is designed to
acco=odate the prosecutor's special responsibility in governmental law-enforcement activities and is
not applicable otherwise." (emphasis added)).
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Utah also has an investigative deceit exemption for government
lawyers. But unlike Florida and Alabama, Utah created this exemption
through an ethics opinion interpreting Utah's version of Ru1e 8.4(c).31 A
Utah bar member "who works for a federal agency that routinely
performs undercover investigative work and covert actions directed
against criminal and terrorist groups" asked whether his supervision or
participation in such activities violated Utah's version of Rule 8.4(c). 3'
The committee that wrote the opinion acknowledged that the text of
Rule 8-4(c) appears to ban government lawyers from participating
personally or vicariously in investigative deceit. 33 Relying on the
comment to 8.4(c), however, the ethics opinion concluded that the
drafters of Rule 8-4(c) did not intend to ban the use of investigative
deceit by government lawyers. 34 The committee specifically reserved the
question of whether "the analysis and result of this opinion apply to a
private lawyer's investigative conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud,
misrepresentation or deceit." 35
Finally, in jurisdictions that have not dealt specifically with the
subject either through rule amendment or interpretation, despite the
categorical bans on misrepresentation and deceit that exist in virtually
every jurisdiction, prosecutors are not, in fact, disciplined on the basis of
vicarious ethical responsibility for the misrepresentations and deceit of
police and informants whom they advise and supervise. Prosecutors in
these jurisdictions thus have a de facto exemption to supervise
investigative deceit.
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THE SYMMETRJCAL APPROACH

A number of jurisdictions now allow both prosecutors and private
lawyers to participate in vicarious investigative deceie 6 In all of these
jurisdictions, Lawyer A and Lawyer B in the scenarios described above
would be allowed to pursue their proposed investigations.
As with the asymmetrical approach described above, some
jurisdictions have accomplished this by amending the text of and
comments to their ethics rules. States that have amended their ethics
rules and comments have taken different textual routes to such
amendments.
Some states have adopted language explicitly permitting lawyers to
supervise covert investigations. Oregon's version of Rule 8.4 is

31. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-05 (Mar. 18, 2002).
32. !d. at~ 3·
33· !d. at 'll 4·
34· See id. at 'II ro.
35· ld. at 'II 2 n.I.
36. See, e.g., Omo RULES OF PRoF'L CoNnucr R. 8.4 cmt. 2A (2ou); OR. RuLES OF PRoF'L
CONDUcr R. 8-4(b) (2oro); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf FOR ATTORNEYS SCR 20:4.1 (2010).
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symmetrical but limited to exempting vicarious investigative deceit. It
states:
[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients
or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional
rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with
these Rules of Professional Conduct.37

Rather than relying on the word "covert" to imply that false statements
and deceit are allowed, the Oregon Rule goes on to state forthrightly:
'"Covert activity,' as used in this rule, means an effort to obtain
information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations
or other subterfuge. " 38 Oregon Rule 8-4(b ), though, places a limit on its
investigative deceit exemption by adding a sort of "probable cause"
requirement, requiring that the lawyer, prior to using deceit, have a good
faith belief in the existence of the unlawful activity the covert
investigation is aimed at revealing. 39
Ohio also adopted a symmetrical and vicarious exemption, using
language similar to Oregon's version of Rule 8-4(b). But Ohio did so by
adding the language to its comment to Rule 8-4(c), rather than by
amending the language of the Rule. The Ohio comment explains that the
Rule "does not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advising about
lawful covert activity in the investigation of criminal activity or violations
of constitutional or civil rights when authorized by law." 4" While clearly
allowing both government and private lawyers to engage in vicarious
investigative deceit, Ohio is not as forthright as Oregon m
acknowledging that "covert activity" entails lies and deceit.
Wisconsin has also adopted a symmetrical exemption for
investigative deceit. Rather than amending the text of or comment to its
Rule 8.4(c), though, Wisconsin amended its version of Rule 4.1 by adding
a new subsection (b). The subsection reads: "Notwithstanding par[agraph]
(a) and [Rules 5-J(c)(r) and 8-4], a lawyer may advise or supervise others
with respect to lawful investigative activities. " 4 ' The Wisconsin
amendment to its Rule 4.1 is more circumspect in its approval of
investigative deceit than is the Oregon amendment to its Rule 8-4(b ),
which explicitly approves covert activity and openly acknowledges that
such activity involves lies and deceit. 42 Wisconsin relies on the phrase
"lawful investigative activity" to imply investigative deceit.
37· OR. RULES OF PRoF'L CoNDUCf R. 8-4(b) (2010).
38. !d.
39· See id. ("'Covert activity' may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or
supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.").
40. Omo RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCf R. 8.4 cmt. 2A (2orr).
4I.

Wrs. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf FOR ATTORNEYS SCR 20:4.1 (20!0).

42· See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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The comment to the Wisconsin amendment is more forthright about
its approval of deception. It states:
[A] lawyer may advise a client concerning whether proposed conduct is
lawful. ... This is allowed even in circumstances in which the conduct
involves some jom1 of deception, for example the use of testers to
investigate unlawful discrimination or the use of undercover detectives
to investigate theft in the workplace .... Paragraph (b) recognizes that,
where the law expressly permits it, lawyers may have limited
involvement in certain investigative activities involving deception. 43
Wisconsin, like Oregon, adds a good faith limitation to its investigative
deceit exemption. 44
The backstory to Wisconsin's adoption of an investigative deceit
exemption is particularly interesting. Prior to the amendment of its Rule
4.1, but while the amendment was under consideration, Wisconsin ethics
authorities dealt with a case involving a criminal defense lawyer's use of
vicarious investigative deceit. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley
dealt with discipline of a lawyer who, in facts similar to those in Scenario
A, hired an investigator to use deception to obtain the complaining
witness's computer. 45 After doing so, a forensic computer expert found
pornography on the complainant's computer, as the lawyer expected. 46
Soon after the deceptive investigation was revealed, disciplinary charges
were brought against the lawyer. 47
In Hurley, a referee assigned to make a report and recommendation
found the lawyer's use of investigative deceit did not violate either Rule
4.1 or Rule 8-4( c). 48 She also found that his conduct was justified by his
constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel. 49 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted the referee's reasoning. 50
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INVESTIGATNE DECEIT

CoNTINUING AMBIGUITY

Virginia has taken a different textual route to allowing lawyers to
participate in deceit during investigations. Rather than directly
addressing either "covert investigations" or "investigative activities," as
Oregon and Wisconsin did in amending their versions of Rule 8-4(c),
Virginia modified its version of Rule 8-4(c) by restricting that Rule's
43· WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATIORNEYS SCR 20:4.I cmt. (20!0) (emphasis added).
44· !d. ("Lawful investigative activity may involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when
the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place,
is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future." (emphasis added)).
45· No. 07 AP 478-D, 2008 Wise. LEXIS II8I, at *8-11 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008).
46. !d. at *II.
47· ld. at *I2.
48. !d. at *17, *26.
49- ld. at *33-38.
50. Letter from Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the Office of Lawyer Regulation 1 (Feb. I I,
2009) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) ("We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous, and we also uphold the referee's conclusions of law .... ").
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prohibition to include only dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
that "reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." 5 ' In short,
Virginia took language commonly used in Rule 8-4(b )52 to restrict the
types of criminal conduct for which a lawyer may be disciplined, then
modified and grafted it onto Rule 8-4( c) to restrict the types of deceit for
which a lawyer may be disciplined.
The Virginia amendment to Rule 8.4(c) is not nearly as clear as the
language used by Oregon, Ohio, and Wisconsin in permitting
investigative deceit. It appears broader, since its language is not limited
to the use of misrepresentation and deceit in the context of
investigations, and it does not explicitly limit permissible conduct to
vicarious deceit. 53 Rather, its language seems to allow lawyers themselves
to engage in acts of misrepresentation and deceit in order to obtain
exculpating, impeaching, or mitigating evidence or information.
Does Virginia Rule 8.4(c) create a symmetrical or an asymmetrical
exception? The text of the current rule fails to distinguish between
government and private lawyers, suggesting that it operates
symmetrically. But a Virginia ethics opinion written shortly after Virginia
amended its Rule 8-4(c) creates doubt about this question. A Virginia
attorney asked a Virginia ethics committee "[w]hether an attorney
working for a federal intelligence agency can perform undercover work
without violating Rule 8-4. " 54 The committee's opinion states:
[T]he committee agrees with the requester that intelligence and covert
activities of attorneys working for the federal government are an
appropriate exception under the new language of Rule 8-4(c), with its
additional language limiting prohibition only to such conduct that
"reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." Accordingly,
the committee opines that when an attorney employed by the federal
government uses lawful methods, such as the use of "alias identities"
and non-consensual tape recording, as part of his intelligence or covert
activities, those methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his
fitness to practice law; therefore, such conduct will not violate the
prohibition in Rule 8-4( c). 55

This passage indicates fairly clearly that personal as well as investigative
deceit is permissible for a lawyer. However, the italicized language
suggests that the exemption is limited to government lawyers, although
the opinion does not explicitly set such a limit.

5L VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.").
52. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 8.4(b) (zoro) ("It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to: ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects .... " (emphasis added)).
53· See VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009).
54· Va. State Bar Council to Review Legal Ethics, Op. 1765 (June 13, 2003).
55· ld. (emphasis added).
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Another area of uncertainty is how state ethics committees and
courts will interpret ethics rules in the many jurisdictions that still have
unamended versions of Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c) setting forth unqualified
bans on false statements and deceit. Ethics committees and courts in
these states may adopt an intentionalist approach in interpreting those
rules and ignore their plain language. It will be difficult for lawyers to
predict how state ethics authorities and courts will interpret such ethics
rules.
Even in jurisdictions that have explicitly approved investigative
deceit, there is ambiguity. For example, Florida explicitly modified its
version of Rule 8-4( c) to allow government lawyers to supervise
undercover investigations.56 Does the fact that the Rule mentions only
government lawyers mean that defense lawyers cannot supervise such
investigations? New York Ethics Opinion 737 approves lintited deceit in
the investigation of "civil rights or intellectual property" cases but is
silent on criminal cases. 57

III.

THE ARGUMENTS

A range of arguments can be advanced both for and against
allowing lawyers to employ deceit in covert investigations.
A.

UTILITY

. Legal and ethical prohibitions as well as moral condemnation of
deceit are based in part on the harms deceit tends to cause both to
individuals and society. 58 The enticement of investigative deception,
though, lies largely in its potential benefits to both society and to
individuals by uncovering truth and falsity. An undercover agent or
informant who lies about her identity and purposes, for example, may
learn the true identities, future plans, and past misdeeds of members of
an organization involved in drug dealing, sex trafficking, or terrorism. A
police sting operation may uncover and help remedy corruption and lies
by public officials. The truth such deception brings forth helps to ensure
that the blameworthy are punished and the dangerous are deterred and
incapacitated.
Misrepresentation and deceit by both defense investigators and
police are motivated by the same laudable goal of ultimately producing
some greater truth about guilt or innocence and improving the quality of
proof used to support a criminal charge. In Scenario A, above, evidence
of the presence of pornography on Complainant A's computer would
help the jury determine the truth about Client A's conduct and

56. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2002).
57· New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Prof'! Ethics, Formal Op. 737 (May 23, 2007).
58. See, e.g., BoK, supra note I, at 18-31.
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Complainant A's allegations. In Scenario B, the defense investigator's
.Facebook ruse may uncover additional witnesses or reveal misconduct or
untruthfulness on the part of Complainant B or other prosecution
witnesses that would persuade the prosecutor to drop or reduce the
charges or to impeach the witnesses at trial.

B.

NECESSITY

Investigative deception, in addition to being useful, is also often
necessary in dealing with crimes and criminals. Prosecutors and police
often need to use deceit to find the truth, because criminal activity tends
to be clandestine. Crimes, by their very nature, are usually committed
covertly, since detection leads not only to possible prosecution and
punishment, but also to social condemnation. In addition to having a
motive to lie, those who commit crimes are often seen as having a poor
character for veracity, a view reflected in our evidentiary rules regarding
impeachment. 59 Many witnesses to crimes, such as drug distribution and
organized crime, are likely to have powerful motivations to lie out of fear
of implication or retaliation. Again, deception is often necessary to get
such people to reveal the truth.
As with arguments based on utility, defense counsel can make the
same argument as police and prosecutors about the need for deceit in
investigating criminal cases. Like prosecutors and police, defense lawyers
and their investigators must investigate clandestine activity and deal with
people likely to lie.
C.

FAIRNESS

As we have seen, the language of the bans on misreraresentation and
deceit found in Rule 4.r(a) and 8-4(c) is unqualified. o This language
covers prosecutors as well as defense lawyers and lawyers in civil
practice. 6' Nonetheless, prosecutors, without negative ethical consequences
or even much criticism, regularly supervise and advise police in the use of
covert investigations that employ misrepresentation and deceit. Such
tactics are used to investigate a wide range of crimes, a tendency that
both the "war on drugs" and the "war on terror" have reinforced. One
might then argue that simple fairness dictates that defense lawyers be
treated the same as prosecutors and allowed to use investigative
deception without fear of ethical sanction, especially in light of their
62
constitutional obligation to provide effective representation.

59· See, e.g., FED. R. Evid. 6og (allowing impeachment of a witness on the basis of a prior criminal
conviction).
6o. See discussion supra Part LB.
6r. See discussion supra Part LB.
62. U.S. CaNsT. amend. VI.

I
1

II
i
i

!

I
!

II

\

INVESTIGATNE DECEIT

:1377

May 20II]

:or's
:tor
tion
the

A possible response to the preceding argument in favor of what I
have called symmetry in permitting investigative deceit is that
prosecutors should be exempted because they have the burden of
proving criminal offenses and must meet the demanding "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Our criminal justice system gives
prosecutors a number of tools, such as conducting wiretaps, obtaining
search warrants, and immunizing or making deals with witnesses who
face criminal liability, to which defense lawyers lack access. Why
shouldn't we treat investigative deceit like these other devices and make
it available only to the prosecution?
One might well draw precisely the opposite conclusion, however,
from the fact that prosecutors have exclusive use of so many investigative
tools not available to defense counsel. Because the defense lacks access
to tools such as wiretaps and immunity, it can be argued that the defense
has a greater need than the prosecution for access to investigative
deception. Defense counsel lacks these alternatives to investigative
deceit in dealing with recalcitrant witnesses.
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ENCOURAGING AND ENABLING EFFECTIVE AssiSTANCE

The need for more thorough defense investigation and greater
defense access to resources to support investigation has become a mantra
of those who seek to improve the quality of defense representation in the
United States. 63 DNA evidence in recent decades has revealed numerous
wrongful convictions, and analysis of these has disclosed a number of
contributing factors. 64 One of these factors is lack of effective assistance
of counsel and, in particular, lack of competent and thorough defense
investigation. 65
The fact that many defense lawyers regularly under-investigate
cases due to lack of time, resources, or inclination suggests that putting a
valuable investigative tool such as undercover investigation ethically out
of bounds for defense lawyers is unwise. If anything, it supports
increasing the investigative options available to the defense and
encouraging use of these options.
Several defense lawyers with whom I spoke during a series of
discussions around the country sponsored by the ABA Criminal Justice
63. See generally Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the
Delivery of Criminal Defense Sendces, 63 U. PnT. L. REv. 293 (2002); Paul C. Giannelli, Alee v.
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CoRNELL L. REv.
1305 (2004); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 W1s. L.
REY.739·
64. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, THE INNocENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceprojecl.org/
understand/ (last visited May 23, 2DI r ).
65. See, e.g., Bernhard, supra note 63, at 294; Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1356-58; Uphoff, supra
note 63, at 744-64; Bad Lawyering, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited May 23, 2on).
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Section in the fall of 2010 complained that police, prosecutors, and
judges criticize defense counsel when they pursue even nondeceptive
investigative techniques, such as having defense investigators interview
witnesses. One recounted an instance in which a defense lawyer was
arrested for simply interviewing the complaining witness in a domestic
violence case. But these lawyers, while agreeing that defense counsel
were often unfairly subject to criticism when they pursued legitimate
investigative methods, divided on whether defense lawyers should be
given an ethical green light to use investigative deceit. Some felt that
approving the use of such deceit is an important step in sending a
message to police, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers that defense
counsel have an obligation and a right to investigate the facts of a case,
rather than relying solely on what the prosecution hands over during
discovery. But other defense lawyers felt that approving defense use of
deceit would augment the chances that defense investigations would be
criticized and viewed with suspicion. Some also felt that the reality of
such criticism, which they believed was unlikely to change, makes many
defense lawyers wary of using investigative deceit and, thus, the
proposed advantages to the defense would ultimately prove illusory.
E.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM

A former prosecutor who favors a symmetrical approach of allowing
both the prosecution and the defense to use investigative deceit made an
interesting argument based on that prosecutor's experience with the
generation and disclosure of exculpatory evidence, often referred to as
"Brady material." This former prosecutor pointed out the questionable
psychological assumptions underlying the current de facto approach of
unilaterally exempting only prosecutors from the ethical proscriptions on
misstatement and deceit in investigations. The current system gives
primary responsibility for developing the evidence in a case- both
inculpatory and exculpatory- to the police and prosecution. This
lawyer's experience had been that police and prosecutors often do a poor
job of uncovering and disclosing exculpatory evidence, because they lack
sufficient incentive to do so and are hampered by an array of
psychological barriers such as "tunnel vision" and nonrational escalation
66
of commitment. This former prosecutor preferred giving the defense a
greater arsenal of investigative tools and resources, including the ability
to conduct its own undercover investigations in appropriate cases,
because the defense has greater incentive to generate Brady material and
encounters fewer psychological challenges in seeking out and recognizing
such evidence.

66. See generally Alafair Burke, Commentary, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor
and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE. W. REs. L. REv. 575 (2007).
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ENCOURAGING LEGAL SUPERVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS

A common and persuasive argument encountered in discussing this
subject with prosecutors and former prosecutors is grounded on the
value of encouraging prosecutorial involvement in and legal supervision
of police investigations. If participation in and supervision of police
undercover investigations were made unethical, this argument goes, it
would not end such investigations; it would simply discourage police
from seeking prosecutorial involvement and advice during the
investigative phase of a criminal case. It would also discourage prosecutors
from taking on and encouraging such supervision. Ethical limits on
prosecutorial participation in investigative deceit would tempt the police
to wait until after the investigation was over to bring their results to the
prosecutor, in order to avoid putting the prosecutor in an awkward
position. No one I talked to, whether prosecutor, defense lawyer, or
judge, thought that less prosecutorial supervision of police is a good idea.
Again, one can make the same argument about discouraging lawyer
supervision of defense investigations. If defense lawyer participation in
investigative deceit is deemed unethical, it will tempt defense
investigators and savvy clients to conduct investigations without
consulting or informing defense counsel. When applied to defense
counsel, this argument may carry less weight than it does when applied to
prosecutors, since defense investigators who are hired and paid by
defense counsel may be viewed as less likely to act without consulting
defense counsel. Additionally, any loss of legal supervision on the
defense side may appear less ominous than a similar loss of supervision
of police.
G.

IMAGE OF THE PROFESSION

A widely shared concern about allowing lawyers to advise and
supervise investigative deception is a potentially negative impact on the
image of the legal profession and the criminal justice system. Here one
may draw a distinction between prosecutorial and defense counsel
participation in deceit. Negative public response to government
investigative deceit seems less likely today than it once did. It is, after all,
sympathetically portrayed in countless movies, television programs, and
novels. Is public response likely to be negative to defense, as opposed to
prosecutorial, supervision of investigative deceit? If such deception helps
to reveal truth and to decrease the number of convictions of the
innocent, the public response to such deceit might well be positive.
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SLIPPERY SLOPE

Another argument against allowing investigative deception is that
once lying is allowed, it will be hard to set and enforce boundaries on it.
If defense lawyers, for example, are allowed to use deception in the
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investigative phase of a criminal case because it is useful and necessary in
revealing truth, then why not allow lawyers to use deception inside the
courtroom based on the same rationales?
CONCLUSION

What about the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Standards? After all, the Criminal Justice Standards and proposed
changes to them are the focal point of this issue. They prompted the
roundtable discussions that gave me the opportunity to hear the views of
many prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges on investigative deceit
and gave rise to the writing of this Essay. What do the Standards say
about investigative deceit? What should they say?
The current Standards as well as the proposed changes to them do
not explicitly address investigative deceit. That is why this Essay focuses
on the drafting and interpretation of state ethics rules modeled on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These state ethics rules, as well as
opinions interpreting them, rather than the Standards, have provided the
focal point for recent discussion, controversy, and change regarding
investigative deceit.
The primary goal of the Standards is to express consensus among
prosecutors, defense counsel and judges on important criminal justice
issues. While there appears to be little current controversy about
prosecutors supervising investigative deceit, the same cannot be said
about defense use of investigative deceit. The roundtable discussions
described in this Essay indicated that attitudes about defense use of
investigative deceit are still divided, even among defense counsel. Recent
changes in the ethics rules of states such as Wisconsin and Oregon
indicate that these attitudes are also in a period of transition. The
consensus that ideally underlies an ABA Criminal Justice Standard,
then, simply does not currently exist regarding defense use of
investigative deceit.
Will consensus about defense use of investigative deceit ever exist?
The answer to that question will depend on how jurisdictions across the
United States react in coming years to the trend of acceptance of such
deceit emerging from jurisdictions such as Wisconsin and Oregon.

